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The Robinson Case 
Charles Calleros* 
I agree with Professor Fish’s conclusions on Professor Robinson’s 
outrageous email to students in his 2009 Sociology of Globalization 
course.1  However, I believe that a full analysis would be more nuanced.  In 
my view, with just a few additional assumptions, Robinson’s email blast 
could be considered in the following way: 1) It was part of the pedagogy of 
his class, despite its political nature; 2) it was subject to good-faith critique 
and mentoring by administrators if his techniques reflected poor pedagogy; 
and 3) it constituted part of the record of teaching that administrators could 
consider in determining whether a professor has earned tenure, promotion, 
or a raise. 
The ACLU has recommended that professors reveal their personal 
views about controversial issues addressed in a course, so that students can 
better appreciate the perspectives or biases of the instructor.  After all, a 
professor is one who has something to profess, something beyond the 
mundane, to offer up for consideration.  Fish is correct that expressing 
one’s view does not immunize the professor from the consequences of 
speech, but neither does such expression automatically fall outside even a 
moderate view of academic freedom simply because it represents a 
professor’s personal political views. 
One can imagine, for example, a professor beginning the class 
immediately following the email with the following statement: 
Over the weekend, I expressed my personal view about how Martin 
Luther King, Jr., would assess recent Israeli actions, and I accused 
Israel of human rights violations comparable to the worst atrocities of 
the last century.  If my comment angered or offended some of you, 
then it’s a good vehicle for discussion and debate.  State your own 
views with conviction, as did I.  Do you agree with my statement, at 
least in part? Do you disagree in whole or part?  Explain your position.  
Stand up for your beliefs. 
Of course, a statement such as this would generate meaningful 
discussion only if the professor had established trust and rapport with the 
class, so that students who vehemently disagreed with Robinson’s email 
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could feel safe to practice their rhetorical skills to explain why his views 
were baseless and biased.  Moreover, assuming Robinson’s email was 
accompanied by no such call for analysis, critique, and discussion germane 
to his class, his email might stand alone as nothing more than an 
inappropriate platform for his personal political views, divorced from any 
pedagogy.  My point here, however, is that the political nature of his 
statement would not necessarily deprive it of academic purpose; even an 
instructor’s personal political views can serve as an invitation to critique 
and respond to a provocative argument. 
Finally, even if an instructor’s political speech can be brought within 
the ambit of his academic freedom to define the content and pedagogy of 
his course, so that he cannot be immediately fired or strictly prohibited from 
exercising his good-faith pedagogic judgment, his school enjoys 
institutional academic freedom to assess the quality of his teaching in good 
faith and in politically neutral ways.  An instructor’s academic freedom 
would not be violated by a friendly visit from an academic associate dean 
who relays complaints about the email and offers advice and mentoring. 
The dean might generate a discussion about pedagogy and recommend that 
the instructor consider eliciting student views about an event of global 
significance without first proclaiming a view so extreme that it diverts 
student attention from the academic task.  Moreover, this institutional 
academic freedom should extend to denial of tenure, promotion, or raises in 
salary based on politically neutral and good-faith assessment that the 
instructor persisted in ineffective pedagogy after being offered assistance. 
 
 
 
